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Abstract: 
 
This article aims to demonstrate the important links that exist between democracy, 
human rights and philosophy. It presents the Swiss political system, which is constantly 
subjected to a tension between the respect of human rights and the respect of democracy, 
due to its semi-direct system of democracy. This article also highlights clearly the 
international relevance of the Swiss problem. Moreover, this contribution shows how much 
the question analysed is rooted in Western political philosophy and is, therefore, not 
‘purely’ legal.  
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Introduction 
 
I would like to demonstrate the important links between the ideas of democracy, human 
rights and philosophy. I will try to prove these connections by using the example of the 
Swiss political system1. Indeed, collisions between human rights and democracy are 
particularly frequent in the Confederation, due to its semi-direct system of democracy2. 
The article is structured as follows: it starts with an overview of some features of the 
Swiss political system (Section 1). Next, it concisely describes the protection of human 
rights at international and national levels in the Swiss State (Section 2), subsequently 
highlighting one major consequence of the interactions between democracy and human 
rights in the Swiss political system (Section 3). The paper also presents the current 
Constitution’s solution to regulate those interactions (Section 4) and determines the notion 
of mandatory provisions of international law (Section 5). After an intermediate conclusion 
(Section 6), the paper attempts to answer the question of whether new limits should be 
created for the Swiss constitutional system (Section 7). Before concluding, there will also 
be an attempt to demonstrate why the Swiss equation is relevant on an international level 
(Section 8).   
 
Main features of the Swiss political system 
 
Switzerland is a semi-direct democracy3 which has specific features, compared to a 
classical representative model4. Not only is the Swiss population called to express its 
opinion concerning major legislative and constitutional modifications, but it can also 
propose a complete or partial revision of its Constitution5. In practice, partial revisions of 
the Constitution are done more frequently, and since 1893, the Swiss population has voted 
over 180 times on such revisions6! As of 2012, 19 initiatives were accepted by the Swiss 
people and the Cantons, the federal entities of Switzerland. Thus, semi-direct democracy is 
not simply a nice but futile concept: it has a concrete and deep impact on the Swiss political 
system year after year.  
The Swiss political system has therefore endorsed the words of Rousseau, when he 
argued that “the power to make laws belongs to the people, and it can only belong to 
them”7. In other words, in Switzerland, the people and the federal entities are truly 
sovereign according to Bodin’s definition of the term, since they usually have the last word 
regarding legal and constitutional norms8. As a reminder, Bodin stated that “the power to 
give and break the law […] is the only feature of sovereignty”9. 
 
1 For an introduction to the Swiss political system, see e.g. Linder, Rolf / Iff, Andrea, The Political System in 
Switzerland, Berne, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2011, p. 3 ff.  
2 For a short presentation of this issue, see e.g. Lammers, Guillaume, Les initiatives populaires contraires au 
droit international, Berne, University of Berne, p. 29ff. 
3 For an introduction to the Swiss semi-direct democracy, see e.g. Auer, Andreas / Malinverni Giorgio / 
Hottelier Michel, Droit constitutionnel Suisse – L’Etat (vol. I), 2nd Edition, Berne, Stämpfli Editions SA, 2006, p. 202 ff. 
4 For more on the representative model, see e.g. Jaume, Lucien, “Représentation”, in: Alland, Denis / Rials, 
Stéphane (dir.), Dictionnaire de la culture juridique, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 2003, pp. 1335-1339, p. 1335 ff.  
5 See Art. 138, § 1 and 2, of the Swiss federal Constitution from 19 April 1999 (hereafter: Swiss Cst.). 
 6 According to the Federal Chancellery’s website (http://www.bk.admin.ch/index.html?lang=fr, accessed 23 October 2012).  
7 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Du contrat social, Paris, Editions Flammarion, 1992, p. 85 (author’s translation).  
8 See e.g. Gonin, Luc, “La notion d’Etat, un concept déterminé ? L’apport de Machiavel, Bodin et Hobbes à la 
détermination progressive de la notion d’Etat”, in: Cashin Ritaine, Eleanor / Maître, Arnaud Elodie (edit.), 
Notions-cadre, concepts indéterminés et standards juridiques en droit interne, international et comparé, Bruxelles 
et al., Editions Bruylant and Schulthess, 2008, pp. 349-377, p. 361 f.  
9 Bodin, Jehan, Les six livres de la République, Darmstadt, Scientia Aalen Verlag, 1977, p. 223 [author’s translation]. 
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National and international protection of human rights in the Swiss political system 
 
There are three main levels of protection of freedoms and liberties, or human rights, in 
Switzerland10. The first one is the “cantonal” level, meaning the sub-national level11. 
Almost every Canton has a Constitution containing norms to protect those freedoms and 
liberties12. On the second level, the federal Constitution has also included, since 1999, a 
significant catalogue of freedoms and civil rights13. On the third level, in addition to these 
two “national” sources of protection, the Swiss population is also able to invoke provisions 
rooted in international law. For example, Switzerland is a member of the Council of Europe 
and recognizes the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights14. It also has, 
amongst other international treaties, ratified UN Covenants no. 115 and no. 2, protecting a 
substantial number of human rights16. 
Thus, in the same way as many other countries, Switzerland refuses to be a Leviathan 
State, which has its origins in Hobbes’ political thought17. On the contrary, this country has 
been deeply imbued with the ideas of freedom and equality, as developed in France and the 
United States in the late 18th century18.  
 
 
 
 
 
10 No strict distinction is made in this article between domestically protected liberties and human rights which 
benefit from international protection. Indeed, at least on a European level, human rights also enjoy a judicial 
review thanks to the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter: ECtHR). Therefore, in the author’s opinion, a 
clear scientific distinction is no longer justified. For more on the internationalisation of “constitutional law”, see 
e.g. Hertig Randall, Maya, “L’internationalisation de la juridiction constitutionnelle: défis et perspectives”, in: 
Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht, vol. 129 no. II/2, Basel, 2010, pp. 221-380, p. 242 ff. (with various 
references).       
11 Switzerland is composed of 26 sub-national entities called Cantons (Linder, Rolf / Iff, Andrea, The 
Political System in Switzerland, op. cit., p. 3).  
12 See, amongst others, art. 9 to 29 of the Bern Canton Constitution of 6 June 1993 (Federal legislation 
[hereafter: RS] no. 131.212); art. 9 to 18 of the Zürich Canton Constitution of 27 February 2005 (RS 131.211); art. 
7 to 33 of the Neuchâtel Canton Constitution  of 24 September 2000 (RS 131.233).  
13 Art. 7 to 36 form the federal catalogue of fundamental rights. For more on these rights, see also Seiler, 
Hansjörg, “Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit zwischen Verfassungsrecht, Richterrecht und Politik”, in: Zeitschrift für 
Schweizerisches Recht, vol. 129 no. II/2, Basel, 2010, pp. 381-546, p. 406 ff. 
14 See e.g. Auer, Andreas / Malinverni Giorgio / Hottelier Michel, Droit constitutionnel Suisse – Les droits 
fondamentaux (vol. II), 2nd Edition, Berne, Stämpfli Editions SA, 2006, p. 44 ff. 
15 Full title: “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” dated 16 December 1966 (RS 
0.103.1).  
16 Full title: “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” dated 16 December 1966 (RS 0.103.2).  
17 For more on this topic, see Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan: or the Matter, Form, and Power of a 
Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil, Ulan Press, 2011. See also Berns, Laurence, “Thomas Hobbes – 1588-
1679”, in: Strauss, Leo / Cropsey Joseph (edit.), Histoire de la philosophie politique, Paris, Presses universitaires 
de France, 1994, pp. 433-459, p. 433 ff.  
18 Indeed, those ideas had a strong impact in the American Revolution and the evolution of the United States. 
The Declaration of Independence from 4 July 1776 states explicitly in its second paragraph that: “We hold these 
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” (for more on that topic, see also 
Henkin, Louis / Neuman, Gerald L. / Orentlicher, Diane F. / Leebron, David W., Human Rights, New York, 
Foundation Press, 1999, p. 134 ff.). A similar affirmation can be made for the French Revolution and its aftermath. 
Thus, art. 1 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen from 26 August 1789 unmistakably states 
that: “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions may be founded only upon the general 
good”.   
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State and on its system of protection of human rights. In this regard, Albert Cohen, the 
famous French writer of the 20th Century, said that “Judaism and Christianity share[d] the 
same desire to transform the 'natural man'” into what he calls a “human man”19. In the 
author’s opinion, human rights clearly promote such a transformation20. One might also 
wonder whether the Apostle Paul’s radical affirmation of the equality of men influenced the 
current understanding of law in Switzerland and whether, at least indirectly, it may have 
favoured the strengthening of fundamental rights21.   
 
One major consequence 
 
One major consequence of the strength of the ideas of democracy and human rights in 
Switzerland is that they may collide in a particularly violent way. For example, should it be 
possible for the Swiss population and the Cantons to vote on a constitutional ban on 
minarets in the name of democracy, or should such a constitutional amendment be 
forbidden in the name of human rights? Furthermore, may a popular initiative seek to 
introduce in the Constitution the automatic deportation of certain categories of foreign 
criminals, or should such an initiative be invalidated because it is contrary to the principle 
of non-refoulement? (Reminder: this principle prohibits the expulsion of aliens to countries 
where they risk heavy persecution)22. 
Though these questions might seem theoretical, they are not. On the contrary, in 2009 a 
majority of Swiss citizens and Cantons accepted a constitutional modification prohibiting 
the construction of new minarets. One year later, they also accepted the principle of 
automatic expulsion of foreign criminals guilty of serious crimes. Therefore, it is no 
exaggeration to affirm that the Swiss political system equals a complex equation in the 
matter. Switzerland must, hence, decide from time to time between the respect of 
democracy and compliance with human rights23. 
The next part examines the actual solution proposed by the Swiss Constitution to solve 
this complex equation.  
 
 
 
 
 19 Cohen, Albert, “Carnets 1978”, in: Cohen, Bella / Peyrefitte Christel (edit.), Œuvres, Paris, Editions 
Gallimard, 1993, pp. 1115-1204, p. 1174. See also Gonin, Luc, “Au-delà du juriste : Albert Cohen, l’homme qui 
dépassait les frontières”, in: Hottelier, Michel (edit.), Albert Cohen – L’écrivain au service de l’Etat de droit : 
Actes du colloque organisé le 18 février 2011 par la Faculté de droit et la Fondation Mémoire Albert Cohen , 
Geneva / Zurich / Basel, Editions Schulthess, 2011, pp. 65-86, p. 78.  
20 Indeed, they try to protect the human dignity that belongs to everyone. On the specific value attributing to 
human dignity, see e.g. Mahon, Pascal, “Art. 7 – Dignité humaine”, in: Aubert, Jean-François / Mahon, Pascal 
(edit.), Petit commentaire de la Constitution fédérale de la Confédération suisse du 18 avril 1999 , Zurich / Basel / 
Geneva, Editions Schulthess, 2003, 67-71, p. 69 ff.  
21 As a reminder, the Apostle Paul stated in particular that: “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither 
slave nor free, there is no male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus” (Galatians 3.28). 
22 For more on the non-refoulement principle, see for instance Allain, Jean, “The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-
Refoulement”, in: International Journal of Refugee Law, vol. 13 issue 4, 2001, pp. 533-558, p. 538 ff.  
23 Human rights have sometimes, though not frequently, prevailed over the democratic principle. For 
example, they prevailed when some citizens wanted to introduce a norm in the federal Constitution which 
authorized the expulsion of asylum seekers without giving them the right to a judicial review of their case (FF 
1994 III 1471 and 1996 I 1305). The Parliament invalidated that constitutional initiative because it noticeably 
violated the non-refoulement principle.   
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The current constitutional solution  
 
According to Art. 139 of the Swiss Constitution, a constitutional amendment proposed 
by Swiss citizens must meet three conditions if it does not want to be declared invalid by 
the Parliament24.  
Firstly, the initiative has to comply with the requirement of consistency of form25. This 
condition requires the initiative either to take the form of a general proposal – which means 
that Swiss authorities would draft the new constitutional norm in case the proposal is 
accepted –, or the form of a specific draft of the proposed provision26. If the second 
alternative is chosen, the population and the Cantons vote on the new constitutional text 
itself. This formal requirement has no direct impact on the interactions between human 
rights and democracy. 
“Consistency of the subject matter” is the second condition27. This requirement excludes 
initiatives from dealing with two different topics. The main purpose of this rule is to protect 
the citizens’ right of vote28. In fact, by banning the presence of two different themes in a 
same initiative, the Swiss Constitution prevents citizens from being in favour of one part of 
the constitutional amendment, but not of the other29. This second condition does not have a 
major impact on the relationship between democracy and human rights. 
  The third condition has closer ties with our issue. Thus, a popular initiative cannot 
infringe “mandatory provisions of international law”30. The main problem with this 
requirement is that the Constitution does not explicitly state what “mandatory provisions of 
international law” are exactly31. For instance, does this expression only include the 
prohibition of genocide, slavery and torture, or does it also include the general principles of 
humanitarian law? In addition, does it only comprise some human rights or all of them32? 
Accordingly, the exact definition of this third condition is fundamental for us to solve our 
“equation”33.   
 
 
 
 
 
24 See, amongst others, Aubert, Jean-François, “Art. 139 – Initiative populaire tendant à la révision partielle 
de la Constitution”, in: Aubert, Jean-François / Mahon, Pascal (edit.), Petit commentaire de la Constitution 
fédérale de la Confédération suisse du 18 avril 1999, Zurich / Basel / Geneva, Editions Schulthess, 2003, pp. 
1088-1101, p. 1091 ff.    
25 See art. 139 § 3.  
26 Ibid., § 2.  
27 Ibid., § 3.  
28 See Mahon, Pascal, Droit constitutionnel I – Institutions, juridiction constitutionnelle et procédure, 2nd 
Edition, Neuchâtel, Faculty of Law Press, 2010, p. 47.  
29 For more on this matter, see also Rentsch, Hans, “Strapazierte Einheit der Materie”, in the newspaper 
“Neue Zürcher Zeitung”, dated 23 January 2012.  
30 See art. 139 § 3.  
31 For more on that topic, see e.g. Zimmermann, Tristan, “Quelles normes impératives du droit international 
comme limite du droit d’initiative par le people ?”, in: Pratique juridique actuelle, Zurich / Sankt Gallen, 2007, pp. 
748-760, p. 750 ff.   
32 For more on these topics, see e.g. Hangartner, Yvo, “Art. 139 (neu) – Abs. 2”, in: Ehrenzeller, Bernard and 
others (edit.), Die Schweizerische Bundesverfassung – Kommentar, 2nd Edition, Zurich and others, Editions Dike 
and Schulthess, 2008, pp. 2159-2169, p. 2161 ff.  
33 See e.g. Gonin, Luc, “L’affirmation de l’existence d’un jus cogens regional – Hérésie juridique et risque 
inconsidéré ?”, in: Meier, Philippe / Papaux, Alain (edit.), Risque(s) et droit, Geneva / Zurich / Basel, Editions 
Schulthess, 2010, pp. 217-230, p. 236 ff.  
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There is a fourth condition, though it is not written in the Constitution itself: a 
constitutional amendment must be achievable. In other words, an initiative cannot propose 
to introduce a constitutional provision imposing highly unrealistic duties on the State34. In 
this context, it must be noted that the Swiss Parliament has a very broad understanding of 
the word achievable. This fourth condition also has no direct impact on the interactions 
between human rights and democracy.  
 
The notion of mandatory provisions of international law 
 
So far, the Swiss Parliament has opted for a quite restrictive approach to the concept of 
mandatory provisions of international law. Therefore, when it had to decide on the 
constitutionality of the initiative to ban minarets, it did not consider it to be in violation of 
those provisions35. It reached a similar conclusion when it had to determine the 
constitutional validity of the popular initiative for the automatic expulsion of some 
categories of criminal foreigners36. Consequently, due to the Swiss Parliament’s relatively 
favourable approach to democracy, there are rather significant risks of conflict between 
democracy and human rights in Switzerland.The position of the legislative power is thus, 
on a philosophical level, influenced by Rousseau, who emphasized along with others the 
importance of democracy37.   
 
Intermediate conclusion 
 
As we have seen, the Swiss political system provides for restrictions on direct 
democracy in the Constitution. However, these are not sufficient to exclude any risk of 
conflict with human rights. On the contrary, recent constitutional practice highlights the 
dangers of concrete collision. Therefore, one crucial question arises: Should new limits be 
introduced in the Swiss political system? This question is actually far more political and 
philosophical than strictly legal, which is what the following section attempts to 
demonstrate.  
 
The question of new limits on direct democracy  
 
Many options have been proposed in recent years to reduce the possibility of conflicts 
between human rights and democracy in Switzerland. One major proposal was to forbid 
any popular attempt to modify the Constitution which would violate internationally 
 
34 See Hangartner, Yvo, “Art. 139 (neu) – Abs. 2”, op. cit., p. 2166.  
35 For more on the initiative for the ban on new minarets, see e.g. Masmejan, Denis, “L'initiative contre les 
minarets repose la question du respect du droit international”, in “Le Temps“ newspaper, dated 4 May 2007.  
36 For more on this initiative, see e.g. Benoît, Anne, “Les règles impératives du droit international comme 
limite matérielle à la révision de la Constitution fédérale”, in: Cashin Ritaine, Eleanor / Maître, Arnaud Elodie 
(edit.), Notions-cadre, concepts indéterminés et standards juridiques en droit interne, international et comparé , 
Bruxelles et al., Editions Bruylant and Schulthess, 2008, pp. 329-348, p. 341 f.  
37 It must be nevertheless stated here that Rousseau was very critical of representative democracy. In fact, the 
philosopher vehemently defended the idea of direct democracy (see Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Du contrat social, 
op. cit., p. 122 f.).  
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protected liberties and freedoms38. Undoubtedly, such a proposal would solve the complex 
equation that Switzerland faces. Nevertheless, in my opinion, this proposal raises various 
important problems. 
Firstly, who would be competent to decide that a popular initiative violated human 
rights? The Parliament or the Judicial Power39? If the Parliament were in charge, one might 
wonder whether that organ had enough legal knowledge to deliberate on such difficult 
questions. Nevertheless, this institution has an important democratic legitimacy. If it were 
the Judicial Power, one might ask why it should only be up to an elite of few to decide, 
rather than a majority of citizens, or their representatives. Would it be on the basis of their 
legal expertise?  
Concerning legal expertise, one must admit that judicial decisions on human rights are 
often rather political than legal40. For example, abortion can be considered as constitutional 
by a judge who asserts that a woman’s freedom to choose must prevail, while another one 
may insist that every foetus’ right to live must be legally protected41.  
Thus, a general invalidation of the power of popular initiatives by the judicial Power 
seems to be, at the very least, questionable. Indeed, giving such power to a constitutional 
tribunal is primarily a philosophical and political decision and not, mainly, a legal-technical 
decision42. In fact, granting such a prerogative to the courts raises the philosophical 
question of the distribution of power within the State and the related issue of supreme 
authority within a Nation43. 
Secondly, one might raise the question of whether it is wise to greatly limit democracy 
for objects as undefined as human rights44. History has shown that the limitation of 
democracy, in general, has not helped the common good, far from it45. Indeed, the 
concentration of powers represents one of the main problems for the rule of law and 
Modern political powers have constantly tried to create institutional check and balance 
systems46. By doing so, modern States do not embrace the Machiavellian philosophy of law, 
 
38 Benoît, for example, proposes a solution that goes in this direction. She proposes to forbid any initiative 
which would violate the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter: ECHR) (RS 0.101). See Benoît, Anne, 
“Les règles impératives du droit international comme limite matérielle à la révision de la Constitution fédérale”, 
op. cit., p. 347 f.  
39 For the moment, this complex task lies with the Parliament according to art. 139 § 3 Swiss Cst.  
40 Indeed, as Moor demonstrated, “written rules do not contain the whole law” (Moor, Pierre, Pour une 
théorie micropolitique du droit, Paris, Presses universitaires françaises, 2005, p. 64 [author’s translation]). 
Therefore, Montesquieu’s affirmation according to which “judges are no more than the mouth that pronounces the 
words of the law” is not correct; on the contrary, judges do participate in the creation of law (Montesquieu, 
Charles-Louis, De l’Esprit des lois (vol. I), Paris, Editions Gallimard, 1995, p. 337). 
41 See e.g. Moor, Pierre, Pour une théorie micropolitique du droit, op. cit. p. 21.  
42 Seiler, amongst others, highlights the interactions between law and politics in the field of fundamental 
rights (Seiler, Hansjörg, “Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit zwischen Verfassungsrecht, Richterrecht und Politik”, op. 
cit., p. 518 f.).   
43 For a general introduction, see e.g. Benwell, Richard / Oonagh, Gay, The Separation of Powers 
(SN/PC/06053), London, House of Commons’ Library, 2012, p. 2 f. See also Dorf, Michael C. / Morrison, Trevor 
W., The Oxford Introductions to U.S. Law – Constitutional Law, Oxford / New York, Oxford University Press, 
2010, p. 95 ff.   
44 On that topic, Seiler asserts even that human rights are “highly undetermined” (Seiler, Hansjörg, 
“Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit zwischen Verfassungsrecht, Richterrecht und Politik”, op. cit., p. 447).  
45 In the author’s opinion, political Modernity should therefore be considered as a perpetual struggle against 
the concentration of powers (see e.g. Gonin, Luc, L’obsolescence de l’Etat moderne – Analyse diachronique et 
contextuelle à l’exemple de l’Etat français, op. cit., p. 39 ff.).  
46 This attempt is particularly evident in the United States, where “the drafters of the Constitution sought to 
establish a system of checks and balances to ensure the political independence of each branch” (Nowak, John E. / 
Rotunda, Ronald D., Principles of Constitutional Law, 3rd Edition, St. Paul, Thomson/West Editions, 2007, p. 71). 
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but rather endorse the principle of separation of powers47. Therefore, it is the author’s 
opinion that every attempt to stifle the voice of democracy should be carefully examined, 
before being carried out.  
Thirdly, human rights are understood in quite a dynamic way by judicial authorities, 
especially on the regional level. The European Court of Human Rights itself writes that the 
ECHR should be applied in such a way48. Therefore, a limitation of the possibilities of 
constitutional amendments by the people would bring uncertainty in the Swiss national 
system. Indeed, what might have been considered constitutional, or conventional, two 
decades ago, might not be accepted any more today or in ten years’ time, even if the norms 
which are applied do not change in the meantime. Accordingly, such an evolution would 
not promote the security of law, one of the main aims of a Modern State49. It would also, in 
addition, foster judicial activism rather than public debate.  
Finally, it must also be said that thanks to the adaptability of the Swiss constitutional 
system, this country has experienced a very long period of civil peace50. Needless to say, 
that is not true of all European countries. Therefore, the weakening of this constitutional 
adaptability is problematic because it may lead, in the long run, to less civilized forms of 
violence. In fact, the Swiss population might have the impression that it has less and less 
political and legal means to influence its own reality. Moreover, this evolution would 
promote populist political parties51. Such developments cannot be for the best of the 
population as a whole, nor favourable to societal, cultural or religious minorities.  
Hence, the prohibition of any popular attempt to modify the Constitution which violates 
internationally protected human rights is not an optimal solution to reduce, in the long term,  
the tension between those liberties and democracy. Indeed, as has been shown, a significant 
restriction of popular rights raises too many legal, political and philosophical problems. 
There is a more promising solution: that of banning only constitutional amendments 
which are not compatible with the essence of human rights52. Indeed, no democracy, 
whether it be direct, semi-direct or indirect, desires to attack the very heart of those rights. 
In fact, such an assault would be contrary to the spirit itself of democracy, a political regime 
that unquestionably puts the individual at its centre.  Such a solution certainly does not 
erase all problems. Nonetheless, it prevents democracy from degenerating into a despicable 
political system. The proposed solution would also have the benefit of being quite 
proportionate, defending both democracy and human rights.  
 
 
 
47 For on an introduction on Machiavelli’s philosophy, see e.g. Lescuyer, Georges, Histoire des idées 
politiques, 14th Edition, Paris, Dalloz Editions, 2001, p. 173 ff.  
48 For instance, the ECtHR stated in the Goodwin case that: “It is of crucial importance that the Convention is 
interpreted and applied in a manner which renders its rights practical and effective […]. A failure by the Court to 
maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would indeed risk rendering it a bar to reform or improvement” 
(ECtHR [Great Chamber], Christine Goodwin v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 28957/95, dated 11 July 
2002, § 74). 
49 For more on the related idea of predictability of the law, see Moor, Pierre, Pour une théorie micropolitique 
du droit, op. cit., p. 56. 
50 The last civil war, the so-called “Sonderbund-war”, took place in 1847 (see Mahon, Pascal, Droit 
constitutionnel I – Institutions, juridiction constitutionnelle et procédure, op. cit., p. 54).  
51 Due in particular to globalization, Switzerland has already witnessed a clear strengthening of the 
nationalist right over the last decades.  
52 For more on the essence of human rights, see e.g. Zimmermann, Tristan, “Le noyau intangible des droits 
fondamentaux : la quête d’une définition”, in: Cashin Ritaine, Eleanor / Maître, Arnaud Elodie (edit.), Notions-
cadre, concepts indéterminés et standards juridiques en droit interne, international et comparé, Bruxelles et al., 
Editions Bruylant and Schulthess, 2008, pp. 299-326, p. 307ff. 
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The international relevance of the Swiss equation  
 
In the author’s opinion, the difficulties faced nowadays by Switzerland also concern 
other countries, such as Spain, France, Germany or United Kingdom in the next few 
decades. Indeed, though the problem of the interactions between democracy, freedom and 
liberties is quite acute in a direct democracy, it is not completely absent from representative 
democracies.  
For instance, do national Parliaments have the right to prohibit the wearing of burqas in 
public spaces although there is a regional system of protection of human rights53? And may 
an elected Congress impose the presence of a crucifix in every school in a Catholic 
country? Would these measures consistent with freedom of religion54? Furthermore, which 
are the exact limits of freedom of expression? For example, may a national law prohibit 
criticism against the royal family?  
These questions underscore the fact that the dilemmas faced by Switzerland today 
concern the rest of Europe too. Actually, they concern all democratic countries. Thus, 
Switzerland is maybe, for once, ahead of its time, underlining future challenges for other 
States. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article shows that what seemed to be a “purely legal” question is strongly linked to 
philosophy in general, and in particular, political philosophy. Indeed, the solution adopted  
by Modern States to solve the issue which has been discussed previously relies heavily 
on philosophical convictions.  
Therefore, the problem addressed in this paper requires each and every one to reflect on 
the exact role of the individual in the political order. It compels, furthermore, every citizen 
to think about the exact role of political power: Must it only ensure civil peace in general or 
should it take extensive measures in favour of minorities? Finally, it raises the issue of who  
should have the final word in a democratic order. Is it the people? The Parliament? Or the 
judges? The answer to this question is highly political and philosophical too.  
Thus, it is no exaggeration to argue that the chosen topic is not limited to human rights, 
and that it is also not only about democracy. In reality, and as this paper has attempted to 
demonstrate, it primarily concerns political philosophy as such and general Theory of law.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 Belgium was the first European State to forbid wearing burqas in public spaces, in July 2011 (see art. 
563bis of the national criminal Law).  
54 See, in particular, the following cases: Lautsi I (ECtHR, Lautsi v. Italy, Application no. 30814/06, dated 3 
November 2009) and Lautsi II (ECtHR [Great Chamber], Lautsi v. Italy, Application no. 30814/06, dated 18 
March 2011).  
 
